Care of the Self

Within the context of the care for the self, Foucault provides a genealogical trace to the

ancient philosophy. Taking care of the self was associated with knowing oneself, which is

ethical in itself, not only for caring for others but also for oneself. According to Foucault, this

ethical understanding of the care for the self has complex relations among people that imply

an act of governing. Hence, Foucault states that “a city in which everybody took proper care

of [themselves] would be a city that functioned well and it would find therein the ethical

principle of its stability” (Foucault, 1984, p. 118). By this statement, he argues that the ethical

considerations of taking care of the self were related to the philosopher’s role and his/her

guidance for the others of the society. Nevertheless, Foucault disagrees with this idea and

asserts that the care of the self has an ontological precedence, unlike the Greek thought that

prioritizes the care of others. When it is required as a duty to take care of others, power

relations emerge in the society in which a master guides people by telling the truth, whether

“it be to exercise a magistery or to have friendly relationships” (p. 118). In order to take care

of self as an ethical practice, there is a need for “ethos of freedom” as a way of “caring for

others” (p. 118). Contrary to top-down power structures in the bodily exercises of the

power—that creates the idea of normality— the ethical self-formation is a complex process

that resembles giving form to an artwork. The aesthetics of the self is an ethical and

ontological issue that requires an art of governing in which no one abuses their power over the

other. At this point, it is essential to know ontologically what we are and be aware of our

capabilities, fears, hopes, and anxieties (p. 119). In doing so, citizens will be able to

comprehend the legal model of the law, which revolves around obedience or violence and the

meaning of being a good citizen. Similarly, the construction of the medical model is based on

population driving the normal and abnormal, ruling according to this knowledge and

principles that result in the population being understood under the issues of normality and

abnormality. Therefore, caring for oneself should be questioned around the questions of who

defines these models and in which paradigms these principles are valid, who the targets of

these models are, and how power relations among the actants are built.

On the other hand, Adorno’s ethical approach toward the self is different from Foucault's. In

his moral philosophy, the care of the self is associated with the critique of the Enlightenment.

He starts questioning the self regarding human nature in the Enlightenment era. According to

him, nature “becomes the chaotic stuff of mere classification, and the all-powerful self

becomes a mere having, an abstract identity.” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 6). There

appears an image of individuality hidden by the social through opting for the average, the

popular, and the common that necessarily represses more creative potential elements. Unlike

the ethical considerations of giving form to a self as a self-aestheticizing activity, culture

hides the repression by naturalizing it. In line with the critique of the Enlightenment, there is

an idea of social coercion in which the “unity of the manipulated collective consists in the

negation of each individual and in the scorn poured on the type of society which could make

people into individuals.” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 9). Nevertheless, this individuality

is a form of pseudo-individuality that the “individual trait is reduced to the ability of the

universal” (p. 125). Unlike the ethical considerations in Foucault in line with the ethos of

freedom, Adorno’s moral philosophy is associated with the Bourgeois class and its “moral

justification for profit” (p. 48). Thus, it is hard to consider the self as a free subject who takes

care of himself/herself and others as a duty and a way of aestheticizing self-formation.

Instead, the changing moral values of Enlightenment thinking as rationalization,

quantification, objectivization, and dispelling of myths/superstitions, are merged with the

controlling of nature by reason. In terms of control, fascism became one of the objects of

desire to dominate the masses and their bodily existence, unlike the ancient art of governing.

Adorno’s first-hand experience of fascism, therefore, challenges the ethos of freedom. The

fascist government takes over the freedom of certain groups (Jews), and their individualities

are objectivized, scientifically categorized, and quantified by the carefully planned

concentration camps in a rational manner contrary to barbaric acts. However, the return of the

repressed—the barbarism that the Enlightenment tried to eliminate— makes reason a tool of

domination by coming under the rule of barbarism.Consequently, the ethical considerations of self-care are discussed in power relations.

Self-care is conceptualized as an ethical form-giving and practice of the ethos and freedom in Foucault’s approach. It requires freedom in practicing self-care; otherwise, it

would become a form of domination of the governor over the governed as a form of slavery. In Adorno’s critical theory, there are notions of totalization, homogenization and a complete rationalization of the self in Enlightenment thought as a single denominator. In contrast to Foucauldian conceptualization of multiple relations and rationalities, Adorno’s homogenized examination of the self within its Enlightened rationality is worth criticizing. Nevertheless, I find Adorno’s experience of fascism essential to scrutinize how the self is objectivized and rationalized in a bodily form of genocide in which there is no power relation between the powerful and powerless. Likewise, Adorno’s critique on the dichotomous structure of nature-human is worth examining self-care. The myth of Odysseus as the perfect diagram of the crisis of modern thought shows the creation of an unbearable desire that refers to nature in the sound of sirens. The crew cannot resist nature as well as their nature. Hence, nature is the enemy in Enlightenment ideas, and domination of nature cannot be happened without dominating ourselves. Man is already in nature that Enlightenment neglects its existence, and this dichotomy ends with self-domination. Even though Adorno challenges the idea of the ethos of freedom, I believe developing democratic and reciprocal power relations enables citizens to take proper care of themselves willingly and to aestheticize every individuals’ life as an ethical form of ethos. Lastly, I affirm Foucault’s ontological

analysis on caring for the self by developing awareness about ourselves in various

technologies of the self, such as writing, meditating, exercising, reading, and the like. On the

other hand, caring for others will be practiced through interindividual relationships in society,

even though Foucault does not discuss the impact of non-human entities on our self-

formation. It would be beneficial to probe how nature is conceptualized from Foucault’s

perspective in addition to Adorno’s strong criticism of nature as the enemy.

References

Fornet-Betancourt, R. & Becker, H. & Gomez-Müller, A. & Gauthier, J.D. (1987). the ethic

of care for the self as a practice of freedom: an interview with michel foucault on January 20,

1984. Philosophy & Social Criticism, 12(2–3), 112–131.

https://doi.org/10.1177/019145378701200202

Horhkeimer, M. & Adorno, T. W. (2002). Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical

Fragments. Stanford: Stanford Uniersity Press.

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